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INTRODUCTION 
Land disputes between the Negev Bedouin and the State of Israel 
have existed long before the establishment of the State of Israel.  The 
Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate did not recognize the 
Bedouin’s land ownership in the Negev, because the Bedouin did not 
register the required documents to prove land ownership.1 From the 
State of Israel’s early days, state authorities recognized the need to 
allocate free land for state use and were aware of individual Bedouin’s 
land claims.2 During the last twenty years, the State of Israel has 
implemented new policies regarding its land disputes with the 
                                                          
1.  Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes Between the Negev Bedouin and Israel, 2 
ISRAEL STUD. 1, 2 (2006) [hereinafter Land Disputes]; see generally Ruth Kark, 
Landownership and Spatial Change in Ninteenth Century Palestine: An Overview, 
TRANSITION FROM SPONTANEOUS TO REGULATED SPACIAL ORG. (1984) [hereinafter 
Landownership and Spatial Change]; see Morad Elsana, The Recognition of 
Indigenous People’s Land: Application of the Customary Land Rights Model on the 
Arab-Bedouin Case in Israel, 7 GEOLOGY J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 59 
(2015) [hereinafter The Recognition of Indigenous People]. See generally Oren 
Yiftachel, Naqab Bedouins and the (Internal Colonial Paradigm, in INDIGENOUS 
(IN)JUSTICE: HUM. RTS. L. AND BEDOUIN ARABS IN THE NAQAB/NEGEV 281 (Ahmad 
Amara et. al. eds., 2013). 
2.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, THE KNESSET (2010), 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/bedouim_eng.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2018). 
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Bedouin.3 The policies were implemented to address widespread, 
illegal construction and land use; and the State’s need to develop the 
Negev for the benefit of its inhabitants.4 The State of Israel’s policies 
led to land dispute claims in court, allowing for settlements providing 
Bedouin individuals with monetary and land compensation.5 
This article reviews the Israeli Supreme Court’s leading decisions 
on the Bedouin land disputes and outlines the historical facts that lead 
to these disputes.  First, the article reviews the origin of the Bedouin 
tribes.  Then, the article analyzes the Bedouin’s claims and its 
arguments for land rights, which was based on traditional customary 
rights and indigenous people rights for the land.  Finally, the article 
reviews the State of Israel’s policies and the arguments in support and 
in opposition of the policies. 
I. INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S LAND CLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 
To understand issues concerning indigenous people’s rights and 
territorial land ownership, one must review the legal history and legal 
contentions during and after European colonizers discovered the New 
World in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  During European 
colonization, the “Doctrine of Discovery” justified the occupation and 
dispossession of indigenous peoples’ land.6 The Doctrine of Discovery 
maintains that sovereignty and full ownership of territory belonged to 
                                                          
3.  Havatzelet Yahel et al., Fabricating Palestinian History: Are the Negev 
Bedouin an Indigenous People?, 19.3 MIDDLE E. Q. 3, 11 (Summer 2012) [hereinafter 
Indigenous People?]. 
4.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, THE KNESSET (2010), 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/bedouim_eng.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 
2018). 
5.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 11; Bedouins in the State of Israel, 
THE KNESSET (2010), https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/ bedouim_eng.htm 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
6.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3-4; see generally Robert 
J. Miller et al., Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the 
English Colonies 1, 2-3 (OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, 2010); see also Erica-Irene Daes 
(Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights), Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous Peoples 
and Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, at 10–11 (June 11, 2001) 
[hereinafter Daes, Protection of Indigenous Peoples]. 
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the nation that discovered the new land.7 The British Crown used the 
terra nullius argument to justify its classification of unoccupied 
territory as “crown land.”8 Terra nullius, or “empty land,” refers to 
unoccupied territory with no sovereignty or recognized system of 
rights.9 The United States Supreme Court and the British Crown Courts 
in Australia and New Zealand upheld the doctrine of terra nullius in the 
nineteenth century.10 However, courts from various states were 
concerned that indigenous populations, living in a territory before 
European colonization, possessed ownership rights to the respective 
land.11 Legal arguments focused on whether a system of land rights had 
existed before colonizers arrived at the disputed territories.12 If a system 
did exist, then arguments focused on how the system determined 
indigenous population’s land rights.13 
In 1920, indigenous people began bringing their cases before 
international forums.14 Decades later, the international community 
began recognizing and advancing indigenous people’s claims in three 
different ways.  First, the International Labor Organization, a United 
Nations affiliate, adopted international conventions.15 Second, in 1990, 
organizations like the World Bank began listing indigenous rights as an 
                                                          
7.  Miller et al., supra note 6, at 3.  
8.  Id. at 5; Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3. 
9.  See generally Miller et al., supra note 6, at 7; see also Daes, Protection of 
Indigenous Peoples, supra note 6, at 11. 
10.  See generally id. at 5; Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous 
Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 57, 72 (1999).  
11.  See, e.g., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 79 (2001) (indigenous 
rights in Nicaragua); Richtersveld Community and Others v Alexkor Ltd and Another 
2001 (3) SA 1293 (S. Afr.) (indigenous rights in South Africa); Mabo v Queensland 
[No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.) (indigenous rights in Australia). 
12.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3; Yiftachel, supra note 
1, at 304. 
13.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3 
14.  Id.; see Daes, Protection of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
15.  Id.; see, e.g., The Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, 
June 2, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247; Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 384. 
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issue of concern, especially in the third-world countries.16 Finally, the 
issue of indigenous people’s rights became internationally recognized 
after extensive research.17 
In 1971, the United Nations created different forums and 
conferences and promoted studies concerning indigenous rights to 
lands.18 The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities funded a study that focused 
on indigenous rights to land.19 The study was funded by United Nations 
Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobo, who is a former Ecuadorian 
ambassador on discrimination against indigenous populations.20 In 
addition to Cobo’s study, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples 
(“WCIP”) held its 1974 inaugural meeting in Guyana.21 Then, the 
United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations was formed 
in 1982.22 Next, the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Indigenous 
Populations was established in 1985.23 Finally, the International Labor 
Organization (“ILO”) adopted Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in 1989.24 Mexican sociologist 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen25 prepared a report for the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in July 1991 and the proclamation of the 
International Year of the World’s Indigenous People in 1993.26 
                                                          
16.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3; Wiessner, supra note 
10, at 107. 
17.  See generally Daes, Protection of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 6, at 9–
12. 
18.  See generally Seth J. Frantzman et al., Contested Indignity: The 
Development of an Indigenous Discourse on the Bedouin of the Negev, 17.1  ISR. 
STUD. 78, 92 (2012); Havatzelet Yahel et al., Are the Negev Bedouin an Indigenous 
People?, MIDDLE E. Q., 19.3, Summer 2012, at 3. 
19.  Id. at 80. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Sarah. S. Matari, Mediation to Resolve the Bedouin-Israeli Government 
Dispute for the Negev Desert, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1089, 1099 (2011). 
23.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 80. 
24.  Id.; Siegfried Wiessner, supra note 10, at 100. 
25.  Rudolfo Stavenhagen was a former deputy director of UNESCO and United 
Nations Special Rapporteur. 
26.  Daes, Protection of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 6, at 9, n.10. 
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In 1994, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities drafted the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.27 
Consequently, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues was founded in 2000.  Later in 2001, Erica-Irene A. Daes28 wrote 
a paper for the United Nations regarding the discrimination and rights 
to land of indigenous peoples.29 During that time, the United Nations 
General Assembly declared the years 1995 to 2004 as the “International 
Decade of the World’s Indigenous People” and established a permanent 
forum to prevent discrimination and protect minorities.30 On December 
20, 2004, the United Nations General Assembly declared the following 
years as another decade for indigenous people.31 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples elevated the international community’s recognition of 
indigenous rights after the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
it on September 13, 2007.32 One hundred forty three nations supported 
the declaration and four nations opposed.33 Israel abstained from voting 
for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.34 
Although indigenous people’s rights gained international 
recognition in 2007, the definition and scope of indigenous rights 
remains flexible.  When the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 
2006,  assembly members disputed over the definition of “indigenous 
people.”35 Because assembly members could not agree on a definition, 
the final version of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
which was adopted in 2007, omitted the definition of “indigenous 
                                                          
27.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 80. 
28.  See generally Daes, Protection of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 6. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3; Wiessner, supra note 
10, at 58 n.5. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 80. 
33.  Miller, supra note 6, at 2; Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, 
at 2. The United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand voted against the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, but later withdrew their 
opposition. 
34.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3. 
35.  Id. at 3-4; Yiftachel, supra note 1, at 304. 
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people.”36 Based on the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and academic literature, the recurring parameters of indigenous 
people’s land rights can be established through the following: 
• original occupancy of the land, determining whether the 
indigenous people are the descendants of the people who 
were first in the particular territory; 
• time duration, determining whether the indigenous people 
have lived on the land from time immemorial; 
• pre-Colonial sovereignty, determining whether the 
indigenous people had sovereignty before European 
colonization; 
• group attached to land, determining whether the indigenous 
people maintain a unique spiritual nature relationship to the 
land on which they live or have lived; and 
• indigenous rights are collective unlike the minority rights 
that are individual.37 
II. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE BEDOUIN’S CLAIM FOR 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
Although the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
was not a legally-binding instrument under international law, it has 
become a benchmark document for future developments in indigenous 
rights.38 In Israel, the Bedouin developed an identity in the late 1990’s, 
which continued into the early 2000’s.  Israeli academics led the 
Bedouin identity development, which occurred in the context of the 
international discussion regarding indigenous people’s land rights.39 
Recently, non-governmental organizations (“NGO’s”), academic 
activists, and the Bedouin community have continued to lead this 
movement seeking international recognition.40 The Bedouin in Egypt 
                                                          
36.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3-4; Frantzman et al., 
supra note 18, at 80. 
37.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3-4; see also Yiftachel, 
supra note 1, at 301. 
38.  Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law Over the Last 
10 Years and Future Developments, 10 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L. 27, 27-35 (2009).  
39.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 78-79. 
40.  See ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., POL’Y BRIEF: PRINCIPLES FOR 
ARRANGING RECOGNITION OF BEDOUIN VILLAGES IN THE NEGEV 1 (June 2011) 
7
Barkai: A Review of the State of Israel’s Land Disputes with the Bedouin
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019
Barkai camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:17 AM 
34 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49 
and South Arabia never sought the same recognition as the Bedouin in 
Israel.41 
The Negev Bedouin asserted its land rights based on a new 
framework, because its land claims would likely fail under preceding 
case law.42 The new framework was premised on customary traditional 
rights, tribal law, and the status of indigenous people rights.43 The 
Bedouin argued Israel, like other colonial regimes, dominated its 
territory, refused to acknowledge the Bedouin’s lengthy presence in its 
private land, and denied the Bedouin’s land rights.44 
Conversely, Israel argued that the Bedouin’s land ownership rights 
were not registered with the State of Israel’s Land Registry Office, and 
thus the Bedouin did not hold official Israeli documents proving their 
ownership under the state’s laws.45 In response, the Bedouin argued 
many of them held traditional documents recognized under tribal law.46 
The Bedouin individuals claimed these documents defined their land 
rights and described the land’s borders, size, and  owner’s names.47 
However, the State of Israel maintained its position that the Bedouin 
did not have customary rights to land in the Negev.48 The State of 
Israel’s land laws, which developed from Ottoman and British Laws, 
did not recognize Bedouin customs as a legitimate source of private 
land rights.49 In 2007, the Bedouin and the State of Israel initially raised 
                                                          
https://law.acri.org.il//en/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Prawer-Policy-Brief-FINAL-
ENG.pdf. 
41.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 84-85. 
42.  See Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
43.  See Noa Kram, State and Bedouin Claims for Land, in INDIGENOUS 
(IN)JUSTICE: HUM. RTS. L. AND BEDOUIN ARABS IN THE NAQAB/NEGEV 129-30 
(Ahmad Amara et. al. eds., 2013). 
44.  Id. 
45.  Morad Elsana, The Role of the Judiciary in Dispossessing Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land: The Bedouin Case in Israel, 34 J. JURISPRUDENCE 333, 339 (2017) 
[hereinafter Role of the Judiciary]. 
46.  Morad Elsana, The Dispossession and Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Land Rights-The Case of Bedouin in Israel, AM. UNIV. 43, 61-62 (2013) [hereinafter 
Dispossession and Recognition]. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 130-31. 
49.  See generally Land Law, 5729–1969, 5 ISR. L. REV. 292 (1970). The law 
abolishes the Ottoman classifications and contains no mention of traditional use to 
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their arguments at the District Court of Beer Sheba in the Al Uqbi 
family cases, which comprised of six consolidated cases.50 After the 
district court dismissed the Bedouin’s cases, the Supreme Court of 
Israel affirmed the district court’s decision in a thorough opinion.51 
III. THE DISPUTED LAND’S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
To better understand the details of the Bedouin’s cases and the 
Israeli Supreme Court’s decision, it is important to review the historical 
impact of land legislation on the Bedouin community and the Negev. 
A. Sovereign Influence over the Disputed Land 
Throughout human history, several cultures and civilizations have 
exercised their sovereignty and control over the disputed land.  
Approximately 2,000 years ago, after the destruction of Jerusalem’s 
Second Temple and the Jewish exile, the Roman Empire ruled the 
disputed land for seven centuries.52 In the seventh century, when 
Muslims conquered the disputed land, Arab tribes began to rapidly 
migrate north from the desert of South Arabia in search of water and 
food for their livestock.53 Then, during the  sixteenth century, the 
Ottoman Empire or Ottoman Turks took control over the disputed land 
and used Islamic principles as a framework to bring Arab tribes 
together.54 Consequently, tribal lifestyle became an integral part of both 
the systems of government and law, which remained prominent until 
World War I.55 During World War I, Britain conquered the disputed 
                                                          
register land ownership; see also Havatzelet Yahel et al., Are the Negev Bedouin an 
Indigenous People?, 19.3 MIDDLE E. Q. 3, 11 (Summer 2012). 
50.  See generally C.C. 7161/06 Al Uqbi et al. v. State of Israel (2012) (Isr.) 
(Hebrew) (on file with author). 
51.  See generally C.A. 4220/12 Al Uqbi et al.  v. State of Israel (2015) (Isr.). 
52. Negev Desert, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Negev_Desert (last updated Sept. 30, 
2016). 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Kark, Landownership and Spatial Change, supra note 1, at 194-95; Yahel 
et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 8. 
9
Barkai: A Review of the State of Israel’s Land Disputes with the Bedouin
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019
Barkai camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:17 AM 
36 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49 
land from the Ottoman Turks and became the mandatory administrator 
for Palestine in 1922 until the State of Israel was established in 1948.56 
B.  Sovereign Land Regulations That Established Ownership over 
Disputed Lands 
The civilizations that occupied the disputed lands enacted land 
regulations that established requirements for land ownership.  During 
Ottoman occupancy over the disputed land, the Ottomans formalized 
and codified The Ottoman Land Code of 1858.57 The Ottoman Land 
Code of 1858 provided the State with ownership over unclaimed lands 
unless land claimants can prove their ownership through registration.58 
The British Mandate in Palestine continued utilizing most of the 
existing Ottoman legal system, including the laws related to the land.59 
These existing laws, combined with British adaptations and additions, 
developed into “The Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance of 1928.”60 
The Ottoman and British land regulations established a process for 
claimants to assert ownership over land.  According to Ottoman 
regulations, ownership of “free land” or “waste land” belonged to the 
State.61 This type of land, also known as “mewat” land (meaning “dead 
land”), is land that was “owned by no one and assigned to no one.”62 
Further, this type of land is “so far away from the edge of the adjacent 
community that the ‘loudest voice of a person standing at the closest 
inhabited place is not heard there.’”63 Under the Ottoman classification, 
the Negev was classified as a mewat land, which belongs to the State.64 
                                                          
56.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 8. 
57.  Ruth Kark & Seth J. Frantzman, The Negev: Land, Settlement, the Bedouin 
and Ottoman and British Policy 1871-1948, 39(1) BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 53, 55 
(Apr. 2012). 
58.  Id.; see Kark, Landownership and Spatial Change, supra note 1, at 192-93. 
59.  Kark & Frantzman, supra note 57, at 55. Elsana, The Recognition of 
Indigenous People, supra note 1, at 58. 
60.  See Kark, Landownership and Spatial Change, supra note 1, at 192-95. 
61.  See Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 11; Kark & 
Frantzman, supra note 57, at 59.  
62.  See generally id. at 11; Kark & Frantzman, supra note 57, at 59.  
63.  Nir Shalev, Under the Guise of Legality: Israel’s Declarations of State 
Land in the West Bank, THE ISRAELI INFO. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. 1, 15 (2012), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_651.pdf. 
64.  See Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 11. 
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Under this concept, one who asserts land rights must prove two things.  
First, a claimant must show that the land is not a mewat land, but rather 
a “miri land” or “inhabited land.”65 Second, the claimant must prove 
the specific allocation of land rights to grant ownership, and the source 
of that right, such as long time possession, heritage, or purchase.66 
When the land is treated as a mewat land, one must also prove he 
revived the mewat land by means of continuous cultivation, and that, 
before 1921, he received consent from the state authorities of either the 
Ottoman Empire or the British Mandate to revive that land.67 If he 
successfully proves that he received such consent,  he gains a 
conclusive “Title Registration” that is open to the public.68 
After the State of Israel’s establishment in 1948, the Israeli 
Parliament enacted a land regulation called “The Law and 
Administrative Ordinance,” which maintained the Ottoman legal 
system.69 Thus, unlike colonies in which Western countries have 
imposed a foreign legal system, the Israeli judicial system was 
grounded on Muslim regulation practiced by the Ottomans.70 This 
means the State of Israel has continued using the same land regulations 
practiced by the Ottomans and the British Mandate.71 
Nevertheless, the Bedouin were aware of registration requirements 
to assert land ownership, and some private ownerships were in fact 
registered.72 However, majority of the Bedouin failed to register or 
address state authorities with land ownership claims.73 
                                                          
65.  See generally Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 45, at 355. 
66.  See Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 46, at 59. 
67.  See Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 45, at 356. 
68.  See Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
69.  Id. at 19; see generally Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948 
(Isr.). 
70.  See Kram, supra note 43. at 129-30. 
71.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 2. 
72.  Negev Desert Region, Israel, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Negev (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
73.  Elsana, The Recognition of Indigenous People, supra note 1, at 58. 
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C. Who Are the Negev Bedouin? 
The Negev is located in the southern region of Israel, primarily a 
desert region.74 This triangular piece of land is bordered in the east by 
Jordan and in the west of Egypt’s Sinai Desert.75 Historically, the 
Negev shared a border with South Arabia, who had swapped land to 
provide Jordan with access to the sea.76 Bedouin Tribes in the Negev 
view themselves as the descendants of nomadic tribes from the Arabian 
Peninsula.77 Nomadic Bedouin Tribes dominated the Arabian Peninsula 
before the rise of  Islam.78 Most of these tribes arrived to the Negev as 
recent as the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.79 They came from 
the Arabian Desert, the Sinai Peninsula, and Egypt.80 Then, they 
wandered with their livestock between  Israel’s neighboring lands and 
the Negev in search for water and food.81 
The extent of the tribes’ territory was dictated by the power of the 
tribe or by the agreements made between the leaders of the tribes.82 
Occasionally, fights broke out between tribes over control of the land.83 
A gradual transition from animal husbandry to agriculture changed the 
tribes’ need for land.84 During this time, the Negev did not consist of 
any permanent towns or villages.85 
The State of Israel’s establishment has dramatically affected the 
Bedouin population in the Negev.  In 1900, the Ottoman established 
Beer Sheba as the first governing town in the Negev.86 Before the State 
                                                          
74.  Negev Desert Region, Israel, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Negev (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. 
77.  A Nomad – is a member of a community of people who live in different 
locations, moving from one place to another in search of grass land for their animals. 
See Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
78.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 9. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 
81.  See id. at 9-10. 
82.  See Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 2. 
83.  Id. 
84.  See generally Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
85.   Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 2. 
86.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 2. 
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of Israel was established in 1948, 65,000 to 95,000 Bedouins lived in 
the Negev.87 During the Israeli War of Independence and its immediate 
aftermath, most of the Bedouin fled to neighboring states.88 The 
remaining Bedouin fought against Israel during the war, while others 
were forced to leave the Negev.89 After the war, the State allowed 
thousands of Bedouin to return to the Negev.90 Most of the returning 
Bedouin were tribes who settled in the Northern part of the Negev.91 
By 1954, the Bedouin population consisted of 11,000 people; most of 
them were concentrated into an area of the Negev called Siyag.92 This 
concentration of Bedouin in Siyag was caused by the State of Israel’s 
military regulation and security policy following its War of 
Independence and war with Egypt in 1954.93 Since the State of Israel’s 
establishment, the Bedouin population has significantly increased to 
approximately 200,000 to 230,000.94 
D. Settlements of Bedouin in the Negev and the  
Approach for a Solution 
From the early days of the Israel’s establishment, the Bedouin land 
rights issue in the Negev raised concerns about the Bedouins’ way of 
life.  In 1962, the State of Israel appointed  committees to study the 
Bedouin land rights issue.95 The committees recommended establishing 
                                                          
87.   Id. at 3; Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 45, at 338; Kark & 
Frantzman, supra note 57, at 75.  
88.  See generally Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 3; see also Bedouins 
in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
89.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2; see also Yahel, Land 
Disputes, supra note 1, at 3. 
90.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 3. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 45, at 338; see generally Yahel, 
Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 3. 
93.  See Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 3. 
94.  See generally Havatzelet Yahel et al., Are the Negev Bedouin an Indigenous 
People?, 19.3 MIDDLE E. Q. 3, 10 (Summer 2012); see also Elsana, Role of the 
Judiciary, supra note 45, at 356. 
95.  See Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 46, at 81. 
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new towns for the benefit of the Bedouin communities.96 The 
committees also recommended resolving the Bedouin land claims 
according to the British Mandate’s The Land (Settlement of Title) 
Ordinance of 1928, which the State of Israel adopted.97 Thus, the first 
Bedouin town, Tel Sheva, was established in 1968.98 Over the next year 
thirty years, six more towns were built providing the Bedouin the 
opportunity to settle communally and enjoy civilized services, such as 
education and health.99 Today,  nearly 100,000 Bedouin live in 
designated urban towns built with government funds.100 The remaining 
Bedouin population reside in hundreds of illegal clusters covering more 
than half a million Dunams.101 
Later, the State provided the Bedouin a ten-year period to file land 
claims consistent with committee recommendations and new 
regulations.102 Bedouin individuals filed nearly 3,330 land claims to 
land registration authorities by the end of 1979.103 In response, the State 
filed counter claims alleging the disputed land was mewat land; 
meaning it is state-owned under Israeli law, because the Bedouin could 
not prove they used the land.104 
IV. THE IMPACT OF BEDOUIN LAND CLAIM CASES AND  
ISRAEL’S LAND POLICIES 
Courts could not rely on any precedent in deciding the land claim 
disputes between the Bedouin and the State of Israel.  Therefore, the 
                                                          
96.  Havatzelet Yahel & Ruth Kark, Land and Settlement of Israel’s Negev 
Bedouin: Official (Ad Hoc) Steering Committees, 1948-1980, BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. 
STUD., 716, 729-30 (2018) [hereinafter Steering Committees].  
97.  Id. at 729-36. 
98.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 3; see generally Bedouins in the 
State of Israel, supra note 2. 
99.  Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 4. One Dunam equals 1,000 square 
meters. 
102.  Yahel & Kark, Steering Committees, supra note 96, at 724. 
103.  SHLOMO SWIRSKI & YAEL HASSON, INVISIBLE CITIZENS: ISRAEL GOV’T 
POL’Y TOWARD THE NEGEV BEDOUIN 19 (2006). 
104.  See generally Talia Berman-Kishony, Bedouin urbanization legal policies 
in Israel and Jordan: similar goals, contrasting strategies, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., 393, 402-03 (2008). 
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State sought to create precedent, starting with the Al Hawashella 
family’s cases.105 
A. The Al Hawashella Cases: 1974-1984 
In 1974, the Al Hawashella family brought cases to the Beer Sheba 
District Court claiming land rights around the city of Dimona.106 The 
district court denied the claims.107 Later, in 1984, the Supreme Court 
denied the Bedouin’s appeals and accepted the State’s argument that 
the Bedouin family failed to prove its ownership claims over the Negev 
lands.108 The Israeli Supreme Court held the disputed lands in the case 
were mewat land or “waste land,” which was recognized by Ottoman 
law as public land that cannot be classified as private land.109 The Court 
determined the lands were mewat land because no permanent 
settlements existed in the Negev when  the Ottoman Land Code was 
enacted in 1858.110 The Court also held the plaintiffs failed to prove 
that they revived and continuously used the land for private purposes 
before 1921, and that they gained the Ottoman Empire or British 
Mandate’s consent to own the land.111 The Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision established precedent for determining Bedouin land rights. 
Despite the Court’s decision, the State of Israel refused to proceed 
with 3,000 other claims that were filed and placed on hold for a long 
time.112 These claims remained with the land registration authorities 
                                                          
105.  C.C. 1/69 (BS)  Salim Al-Hawashella and Others v. State of Israel, (1974) 
(on file with author, in Hebrew) (Isr.); C.C. 3/69 (BS) Salim Al-Hawashella and 
Others v. State of Israel, (1974) (on file with author, in Hebrew) (Isr.); C.C. 17/69 
(BS)  Salim Al-Hawashella and Others v. State of Israel, BS (1974) (on file with 
author, in Hebrew) (Isr.). 
106.  C.A. 218/74, Al-Hawashella v. State of Israel, P.D. 38(3) 141, 141-143 
(1984) (on file with author, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  
107.  Id. 
108.  See Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 11. 
109.  See Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 46, at 112. 
110.  Id.; C.A. 218/74, Salim Al-Hawashella v. State of Israel, P.D. 38(3) 141, 
151 (1984) (on file with author, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  
111.  C.A. 218/74, Salim Al-Hawashella v. State of Israel, P.D. 38(3) 141, 151 
(1984) (on file with author, in Hebrew) (Isr.).  
112.  NEGEV COEXISTENCE F. FOR CIV. EQUALITY, PROCESSES OF 
DISPOSSESSION IN THE NEGEV-NAQAB: THE ISRAELI POL’Y OF COUNTER CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE BEDOUIN-ARABS 11 (2006). 
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until early 2003, because the State preferred a compromise over the 
Bedouin’s private land claims.113 
B. The 2001 Conflict Caused the Creation of a New Policy 
The State realized the Bedouin’s land right claims were an 
immediate concern, because illegal construction significantly increased 
throughout the Negev.114 A 2005 report showed that 40,000 illegal 
construction projects had spread throughout the Negev.115 Between 
1948 and 2000, the Negev’s landscape dramatically changed.116 After 
residing in tents and temporary huts for several years, many Bedouin, 
who lived in unrecognized clusters, started building houses and 
commercial centers; ignoring the law prohibiting the Bedouin from 
construction without the State’s approval.117 Throughout those years, 
the State of Israel refused to confront the Bedouin and refrained from 
enforcing its rights, orders, and regulations over the disputed lands.118 
Some critics believe the State was very tolerant of the Bedouin 
communities and their illegal structures.119 Other critics may believe 
the Bedouin claims were complicated and that the Israeli government 
postponed any potential confrontation with the Bedouin, because the 
government understood the Bedouin’s needs and did not have an 
official land designation plan at the time.120 
                                                          
113.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
114.  See id. 
115.  NEGEV COEXISTENCE F. FOR CIV. EQUALITY, THE ARAB-BEDOUINS OF 
THE NAQAB-NEGEV DESERT IN ISRAEL 17 (2012). 
116.  See generally Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
117.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2; see Yahel, Land Disputes, 
supra note 1, at 4-5. 
118.  Id. at 12. 
119.  See Ben Sales, Bedouin Relocation Faces Opposition Left and Right, THE 
TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.timesofisrael.com/bedouin-relocation-
faces-opposition-left-and-right/; see Issue Summary: Negev Bedouin, INTER AGENCY 
TASK FORCE ON ISRAELI ARAB ISSUES (Jan. 2018), 
http://www.iataskforce.org/issues/view/2. 
120.  See, e.g., Martin Raffel, Negev Bedouins: Challenge for Israel, Priority 
for the Jewish People, NEW JERSEY JEWISH NEWS (May 11, 2017), 
https://njjewishnews.timesofisrael.com/negev-bedouins-challenge-for-israel-
priority-for-the-jewish-people/. 
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The Israeli government approved a broad investment plan for the 
Bedouins in the Negev because it acknowledged the urgency to address 
the spread of illegal settlements and construction throughout the 
Negev’s hills.121 The Israeli government also recognized that it must 
provide the Bedouin with towns and legal villages.122 To accomplish 
this goal, the Israeli government believed court decisions or legal 
settlements were necessary to resolve the Bedouin’s land rights claims 
in the Negev.123 In 2004, under the government’s new policy, 500 cases 
were filed in the Beer Sheba District Court, demanding that the State of 
Israel recognize Bedouin’s land ownership in the Negev. 
Despite the Israeli government’s position regarding proof of 
ownership, it sought to adopt a policy that considers the Bedouin’s 
strong connection to the land.124 Accordingly, many Bedouin cases 
were settled.125 However, courts rejected many unsettled claims by 
applying the existing land regulation, proof requirements, and the 
Israeli’s Supreme Court’s precedent in the Al Hawashella cases.126 
Consequently, about 300 cases were closed.  Today, several cases 
remain pending in courts and at the Land Registration office; however, 
some cases have not been filed.127 
C. The Al Uqbi Cases 
The Al Uqbi family’s land claims are the most important Bedouin 
land claim cases heard by the Israeli Supreme Court.  In 2006, the Al 
Uqbi family members insisted on pursuing their six pending cases in 
the Beer Sheva District Court and asserting their family’s land rights in 
the Negev.128 The family members raised five arguments to assert their 
land rights over the Negev land.  First, they argued Israel’s land law, 
                                                          
121.  See generally Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 13. 
122.  See generally Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
123.  See generally Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 1, 11. 
124.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 11.  
125.  See id. at 11-12. 
126.  See Elsana, Dispossession and Recognition, supra note 46, at 72-77. 
127.  See HUM. RTS. WATCH, OFF THE MAP: LAND AND HOUSING RTS. 
VIOLATIONS IN ISRAEL’S UNRECOGNIZED BEDOUIN VILLAGES 104-05 (2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/iopt0308/iopt0308webwcover.pdf.  
128.  See generally C.C. 7161/06 Al Uqbi et al. v. State of Israel (2012) (Isr.) 
(Hebrew) (on file with author).  
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following Ottoman regulations, provided them land rights.129 Second, 
because the Al Uqbi family members had a long history of occupying 
the land through settlement and cultivation, they claimed land rights 
based on length of occupation.130 Third, the family members claimed 
they gained land rights through customary tribal law, which recognized 
agreements made between the tribes in bordering lands.131 Fourth, they 
claimed the British Mandate recognized their land rights based on the 
Bedouin way of life.132 Finally, the family members asserted they had 
indigenous rights that are recognized by international law through the 
2007 United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights.133 
The district court heard extensive academic expert testimony from 
both sides.134 Professor Yiftachel spoke on behalf of the Al Uqbi 
family, while Professor Kark spoke on behalf of the State.135 
Specifically, the experts reviewed the land’s history and geography, and 
traditional Bedouin tribal customs.136 The Beer Sheba District Court 
denied the Al Uqbi family’s arguments.137 Ultimately, the district 
court’s order granted the State with ownership over the disputed land.138 
The Israeli Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order. 
The Israeli Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s order. 
Justice Hayut wrote the leading opinion, joined by Justice Rubinshtein 
and Justice Gubran, emphasizing that the Al Uqbi family’s claims failed 
to demonstrate its land rights according to Israeli land laws.139  The 
                                                          
129.  CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶ 2 (May 14, 2015) translated in 
The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
130.  Id. ¶ 2, 3.  
131.  Id. ¶ 36. 
132.  Id. ¶ 12. 
133.  Id. ¶ 80. 
134.  See id. ¶ 3. 
135.  See id. 
136.  CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶ 3 (May 14, 2015) translated in 
The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
137.  See id. ¶ 2. 
138.  See generally id. 
139.  CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶ 3 (May 14, 2015) translated in 
The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
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Court accepted the State’s contention that there was no type of Bedouin 
settlement nor cultivation on the land under the Ottoman land 
regulation.140  Thus, the Court decided the disputed land was mewat 
land acknowledging the State’s land ownership rights.141 
Like the Al Hawashella cases, the Al Uqbi family members failed 
to prove that they revived and continuously used the land for private 
purposes before 1921, and attained consent from the Ottomans or the 
British Mandate to the revive the land.142 The Court denied the family’s 
argument that the British Mandate had recognized or respected the 
Bedouin rights to the land, according to customary tribal law 
tradition.143 The Court ruled that, according to the British Mandate’s 
mewat land regulation, individuals had to register their claims to assert 
their land rights, and that the Al Uqbi family members failed to prove 
they registered accordingly.144 The Court’s ruling was expected, 
because nothing proved that the Bedouin community knew of the 
registration requirements, let alone asserting land rights claims. 
The Al Uqbi family claimed its land rights arose from customary 
tribal law.  The family argued the Ottoman government and the British 
Mandate respected the Bedouin’s customary tribal law by granting it 
autonomy to practice tribal law in land matters.145 However, the Court 
denied the family’s argument holding that, even if the Bedouins 
effectively controlled the land, there was no evidence that the Ottoman 
or British Mandate granted the Bedouin some autonomy to practice 
tribal law in a way that asserts land ownership rights over the Negev.146 
Conversely, historical evidence proved that the Ottoman 
government enforced its land regulations on the Bedouin.147 
                                                          
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
140.  Id. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. ¶ 3. 
144.  Id. ¶ 46. 
145.  CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶ 5 (May 14, 2015) translated in 
The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
146.  Id. ¶ 47. 
147.  Kark, Landownership and Spatial Change, supra note 1, at 194-95. 
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Additionally, the Court held evidence of internal agreements dividing 
lands among Bedouin tribes insufficiently proved that the governing 
authority recognized customary tribal law.148 In fact, most of the 
family’s evidence proved that governing authorities did not recognize 
Bedouin land rights arising out of customary tribal law.149 
The Court also denied the family’s argument that the practice of 
purchasing land to build cities, such as Beer Sheba and Dorot Kibbutz, 
was evidence of Bedouin land ownership.150 The Court distinguished 
the family’s cases with its evidence showing private cases where 
Bedouin individuals registered their land establishing ownership.151 
Thus, the family’s evidence did not prove the Ottoman government 
recognized Bedouin tribal law.152 
The Al Uqbi family also claimed its indigenous rights arose from 
the 2007 United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights.153 This was 
the first time that this argument was brought to the Israeli Supreme 
Court.154 However, the Israeli Supreme Court denied the family’s 
argument because Israeli law provided that an international declaration 
has no legal effect unless adopted by state under legislation or 
agreement.155 As to indigenous rights, the State of Israel has neither 
joined the 2007 U.N. Declaration of Indigenous People nor adopted its 
regulations.156 Like the State of Israel, many countries have not adopted 
2007 United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights or recognized 
the existence of indigenous rights.157 Before other countries are 
                                                          
148.  CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶ 35 (May 14, 2015) translated in 
The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.). 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. ¶ 37. 
151.  Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. ¶¶ 14-15. 
154.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 80. 
155.  See CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶¶ 80, 81 (May 14, 2015) 
translated in The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
156.  See id. ¶ 81. 
157.   Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. HUM. RTS.: OFF. 
OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/ipeoples/pages/ 
declaration.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2019], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol49/iss1/3
Barkai camera ready (Do Not Delete) 12/27/2018  10:17 AM 
2018] ISRAEL’S LAND DISPUTES WITH THE BEDOUINS 47 
required to adopt a customary legal practice, international law requires 
the practice be recognized by a majority of countries.158 The Al Uqbi 
family did not present any evidence proving an international convention 
or customary international law applies to its cases.159 As a result, the 
Supreme Court refused to conduct an extensive analysis on the issue of 
whether the Bedouin are indigenous people in the Negev.160 
The Supreme Court also determined the family’s argument that it 
constituted private individual claims and not a collective tribal claim 
for indigenous rights.161 The Supreme Court distinguished the Al Uqbi 
cases from the Australian Supreme Court’s decision in Mabo v. 
Queensland.162 Unlike the collective tribal claim for recognition of land 
rights in Mabo, the Al Uqbi case involved individual claims.163 Thus, 
the Israeli Supreme Court determined disputed land was owned by the 
State. 
D. Reaction to the Al Uqbi Case 
The Al Uqbi case fueled academic research and writing regarding 
whether the Bedouin are indigenous people of the Negev and whether 
their land claims should be recognized under traditional tribal law.164 
Some scholars argued the Bedouin are not the only people who can 
                                                          
158.  Christopher Greenwood, Sources of International Law: An Introduction, 
U.N. OFF. OF LEG. AFF., http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/ greenwood_outline.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
159.  CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶¶ 80, 81 (May 14, 2015) translated 
in The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
160.  See id. 
161.  Id. ¶ 81. 
162.  Id. (citing Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 5 (Austl.)); see 
also Yiftachel, supra note 1, at 304. 
163.  See CA 4220/12 Al Uqbi v. State of Israel, ¶ 81 (May 14, 2015) translated 
in The State of Israel, The Judiciary Authority Supreme Court (Isr.), 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\12\20
0\042\v29&fileName=12042200.V29&type=4. 
164.  Ahmad Amara, Colonialism and Cause Advocacy in the Naqab, in THE 
NAQAB BEDOUIN AND COLONIALISM: NEW PERSPECTIVES 173 (Nasasra et al. eds., 
2015). 
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claim to the notion of being the “first people” in the land of Israel.165 
For example, Jewish people’s attachment to the Negev predates Arab 
presence.166 While countless other groups lived in the Negev for 
different periods of time, none of their presence compares to Jewish 
presence, because of their uninterrupted presence on the land since 
biblical times.167 Some archaeological evidence has shown that Jewish 
people have lived in the land from the Negev to the Golan three 
thousand years ago.168 
Additionally, the Bedouin tribes have never asserted indigenous 
rights for lands in Egypt or South Arabia.  Although the critical element 
for indigenous rights is the original occupation of the land, the Bedouin 
tribes migrated from their historical homeland in the Arabian Desert to 
the Negev.169 However, some scholars still argue the Bedouin tribes 
lived in the Negev for hundreds of years while the Negev was a free 
land.170 They believed the Bedouin ruled the desert by occupying 
land.171 Many academics and NGOs support the Bedouin’s claim for 
indigenous rights in the Negev.172 
V. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT’S COMPROMISE TO RESOLVE THE 
BEDOUIN LAND DISPUTES 
The Negev land disputes must be resolved to develop and advance 
the Negev’s infrastructure for the benefit of its inhabitants.  Since the 
early 1970’s, Bedouin families, who were willing to move, were offered 
compensation in both land and money to settle their claims.173 The 
amount of compensation depended on the type and size of the land 
claimed.174 The families that moved to towns benefited from 
                                                          
165.  See generally Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 6. 
166.  See generally id. 
167.  See id. at 8; see also Elsana, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 45, at 340. 
168.  Yahel et al., Indigenous People?, supra note 3, at 5-6. 
169.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 11. 
170.  See Avika Bigman, Why the Bedouin’s Claims to the Negev are 
Outrageous, THE TOWER (Jan. 2014), http://www.thetower.org/article/why-the-
bedouins-claims-to-the-negev-are-outrageous/  
171.  Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 8. 
172.  Frantzman et al., supra note 18, at 82, 91.   
173.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
174.  See id. 
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government infrastructure and services, including education and health 
care.175 
Through recent years, specifically after 2001, the Bedouin land 
dispute also encompassed historical, social, financial, cultural, and 
ethnic issues.176 To resolve such issues, the State of Israel considered 
the Bedouin’s strong attachment to the land it occupied.177 Hence, 
despite the Supreme Court’s rulings in the Al Hawashella case and the 
cases that followed, the Israeli government adopted a state policy of 
compromising with Bedouin.178 The government believed it needed to 
develop more towns in the Negev to benefit the Bedouin.179 In planning 
the construction of new Negev Bedouin towns, the Israeli government 
cooperated with Bedouin community leaders and identified the needs 
of the Bedouin communities.180 
A.  The Government’s Proposal Committee 
In October 2007, the Israeli government formed a public committee 
to create the Proposal of Bedouin Settlement Arrangement Policy for 
the Negev.181 The committee was chaired by Supreme Court Justice 
Goldberg, two members from the general public, and two members 
from the Bedouin community.182 According to the government’s 
resolution, the committee’s mandate states: 
The committee [brought] forward its recommendations in order to 
form a comprehensive plan, which is large-scale and attainable, 
which [defined] the conditions for the settlement of the Bedouin in 
the Negev in general, the amount of compensations, the regulations 
                                                          
175.  See id. 
176.  See id. 
177.  See id. 
178.  See id.; ZE’EV V. BEGIN, REGULARIZATION OF BEDOUIN COMMUNITIES IN 
THE NEGEV: SUMMARY OF THE PUB. HEARING ON THE DRAFT L. AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POL’Y AND FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT 2 (2013). 
179.  See Bedouins in the State of Israel, supra note 2. 
180.  See id. 
181.  THE REGIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES IN THE 
NEGEV-RCUV, GOLDBERG COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS 3-5 (2011) 
[hereinafter Goldberg Commission], http://www.landpedia.org/landdoc/ 
Analytical_materials/Goldberg_recommendations-english.pdf. 
182.  Id. at 3. 
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for allocation of alternative lands, urban amenities and a time 
schedule to translate the regulations in legal directives, as 
required.183 
The following year, in December 2008, the committee submitted 
its proposals to the Minister of Housing.184 The committee 
recommended one declaration recognizing the Bedouin’s historical link 
to the land, a second declaration emphasizing respect for equal rights, 
and a third declaration showing the Bedouin’s respect and obligation to 
the State of Israel’s laws.185 
The committee’s recommendations also included alternatives to 
resolve the Bedouin’s land claims and the illegal settlements in the 
Negev.186 The committee also recommended the formation of a land 
claims committee that would provide compensation to people who 
could prove long-standing land possession or agriculture use of land 
since 1948.187 The committee provided a lengthy criteria to calculate 
the compensation amount based on the claimed land’s size.188 However, 
a minority of the committee, mainly comprised of Bedouin members, 
were not satisfied with the measure of compensation.189 To resolve the 
illegal settlements in the Negev, the committee recommended a solution 
to legalize the main Bedouin communities; while still vigilantly 
enforcing the law to prevent further illegal construction in the Negev.190 
B.  The Prawer Plan 
In January 2009, the government decided that the committee’s 
report would provide the basis for a new policy resolving the Bedouin 
                                                          
183.  Id. at 69. 
184.  Id. at 70. 
185.  See id. at 25; ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 3. 
186.  ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 4. 
187.  Goldberg Commission, supra note 181, at 38. 
188.  See id. at 39-40, 62; ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 
4. 
189.  See Arik Rudnitzky & Thabet Abu Ras, The Bedouin Population in the 
Negev: Social, Demographic and Economic Factors, THE ABRAHAM FUND 
INITIATIVE, 113-14 (2012). 
190.  Goldberg Commission, supra note 181, at 28-31; ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN 
ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 2. 
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settlements in the Negev.191 The government  arranged a team of eight 
individuals, headed by Mr. Ehud Prawer, to implement the Goldberg 
Committee’s recommendation and to resolve the land disputes between 
the Negev Bedouins and the State.192 There were no Bedouin members 
on Prawer’s team.  On May 31, 2011, the Prawer Committee’s report 
presented a declaration that keeps the Goldberg Committee’s policies, 
emphasizing the need for an immediate solution and enforcement of 
law.193 
However, in addressing the Bedouin land claims, the Prawer 
Committee adopted the Bedouin members’ minority position in the 
Goldberg Committee and proposed new parameters for 
compensation.194 The new proposal provided that the villagers should 
be offered compensation between the amounts of $1.7 billion and $2.4 
billion, including $365 million for expanding the townships.195 The 
compensation would be reduced to zero after five years and, if 
agreements could not be reached, the land would be forfeited and 
designated as the State’s land.196 
In addressing the illegal settlements, the Prawer Committee 
adopted the Goldberg Committee report’s guidelines.197 The Goldberg 
Committee found that an estimated fifty percent of illegal 
settlements were built within Jewish planning areas.198 The Prawer 
Committee  recommended that the 30,000 inhabitants199 of the illegal 
                                                          
191.  The Prawer Plan, NEGEV COEXISTENCE F. FOR CIV. EQUALITY, 
https://www.dukium.org/the-prawer-plan/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
192.  See ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 2. 
193.  NEGEV COEXISTENCE F. FOR CIV. EQUALITY, ALTERNATIVE NGO REP.: 
INFO. FOR ESTABLISHING LIST OF ISSUES FOR THE STATE OF ISRAEL BEFORE THE 
COMMITTEE ON CIV. AND POL. RTS. 23-24 (2012). 
194.  See ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 2. 
195.  Yori Yanover, Pro Bedouin Land Grab Hooligans send 10 Police to 
Hospital, JEWISHPRESS (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.jewishpress.com/news/ breaking-
news/pro-bedouin-invaders-land-grab-hooligans-send-10-police-to-
hospital/2013/12/01/. 
196.  Id. 
197.  See ASS’N FOR CIV. RTS. IN ISR. ET AL., supra note 40, at 2-3. 
198.  Goldberg Commission, supra note 181, at 29. 
199.  These 30,000 inhabitants were forty percent of the total Negev Bedouin 
population unrecognized by Israel. The Bedouin in Israel, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF. (Oct. 30, 2013), https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ AboutIsrael/Spotlight/Pages/The-
Bedouin-in-Israel.aspx. 
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settlements should be relocated to the seven existing government-built 
Bedouin towns.200 
C. Minister Begin’s Report 
On September 2011, the Israeli Cabinet adopted the “Prawer Plan 
Outline”201 and published a draft of a law regarding the status of the 
Bedouin in the Negev, which incited public protest.202 The Cabinet 
Resolution called for a special “public hearing” that would be 
conducted for a six-week period.203 This process was extended to more 
than three months, and included dozens of meetings with Bedouin 
leaders, private individuals, groups, and organizations, generally 
originating from the Negev.204 The public hearing’s purpose was to 
consider people’s comments, input, and reservations.205 In the end, 
Minister Begin presented a report that listed recommendations, 
corrections or changes that related to land or monetary compensation 
increases for the Bedouins.206 Minister Begin’s report also 
recommended saving land inside Bedouin towns for future 
generations.207 Also, Minister Begin emphasized the immediate need to 
accelerate the compensation process and the need to enforce the law 
against illegal construction.  Minister Begin’s report concluded as 
follows: 
The Government of Israel views the accelerated development of the 
Negev as a most important national goal, and to this end, it intends 
to implement far-reaching programs in the coming years.  Improving 
the social and economic situation of the Negev Bedouin, mainly in 
education and employment, while enhancing the rule of law in the 
                                                          
200.  Id. 
201.  BEGIN, supra note 178, at 2.  
202.  Daniel Tepper & Samuel Gilbert, “Day of Rage” over Bedouin 
Displacement Plan, Al Jazeera (Aug. 2, 2013), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2013/08/20138216944374202.html. 
203.  BEGIN, supra note 178, at 2. 
204.  Id. at 2. 
205.  See id. at 3 (“While listening to the public, we heard many expressions of 
solidarity with the State among the Bedouin and . . . of injustice and demands that it 
be rectified, as well as serious reservations . . . we also heard proposals.”). 
206.  Id. at 12-13. 
207.  Id. at 14. 
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area, is an inseparable part of this effort, and the Bedouin’[s] 
integration into the prosperity of the Negev will benefit all its 
residents.  The proposal presented here relies on three solid 
components: a budget for improving the physical infrastructure and 
socio-economic development; the planning principles for 
regularizing the status of Bedouin settlement in the Negev; and a 
legal mechanism, to be legislated, to regularize Bedouin ownership 
claims in the Negev.  With regard to these three components of the 
Government program to resolve the issue of the Negev Bedouin, this 
document addresses the main points that were raised in the 
discussions with groups and individuals during the public hearing 
which took place during 2012.  The scope of this overall program 
and an understanding of its far-reaching implications for the future 
of the children constitute a solid foundation for broad consensus 
among those Bedouin who claim land ownership and 16 Bedouin 
who reside in places that are not regularized for residence, with the 
support of other groups among the Negev Bedouin.  The 
Government’s goal in this important field should be advanced as 
soon as possible by legislating the “Law for the Regularization of 
Bedouin Settlement in the Negev”.  This law will determine, inter 
alia, a binding and time-limited framework for the process of 
regularizing settlement, so that five years after the law comes into 
effect, land which was not awarded to ownership claimants in the 
framework of the special regularization procedure will be registered 
to the State.  Time is pressing, and without such framework, we will 
fail to realize the purpose of this entire move – regularizing 
settlement in the short period time during which it is still possible.  
The process of implementing the plan and the law will take several 
years, and we cannot ignore the obstacles that will undoubtedly arise.  
However, given the terms outlined here, there is a real chance now 
that good progress can be made towards resolving this complex issue 
– a resolution that will greatly contribute to all the residents of the 
Negev.  All those involved should mobilize to fulfill this important 
task.208 
VI. THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION TO SETTLE THE  
BEDOUIN LAND CLAIMS 
Minister Begin’s recommendations were implemented in a 
legislative draft (the “Bill”) to resolve the Bedouin land settlement in 
                                                          
208.  Id. at 15-16. 
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the Negev.209 According to the Bill’s legislative plan, the Bedouin 
would control sixty-two percent of its claimed lands, while the 
remaining thirty-eight percent shall be recognized as the State’s land; 
any Bedouin structures within the State’s land would necessarily be 
demolished.210 This decision met significant criticism from civil rights 
organizations and Bedouin representatives, who claim the plan ignores 
Bedouin rights.211 Conservative Jewish groups also criticized the plan 
because it generously conceded to Bedouin pressure.212 On June 24, 
2013, the new Parliament received a draft of the legislation and got it 
passed the first reading with a 40-43 majority vote.213 
A. The Bill’s Main Principles 
According to the Bill’s introduction, the Israeli government saw the 
Negev’s development as one of the decade’s most important national 
tasks.214 Accordingly, the plan would provide socio-economic support 
and growth opportunities for the Negev Bedouin, as it constitutes 
Israel’s poorest population and live in harsh conditions.215 The plan 
recognized Bedouin individuals are entitled to these provisions, 
because they are citizens of the State of Israel.216 As Israeli Defense 
Forces moved into the Beer Sheba region and waves of investments 
permeated into north Negev, the Bedouins were in a great position to 
benefit from the region’s anticipated prosperity.217 The plan’s 
framework offered a systemic solution to the Bedouin communities’ 
land, settlement, employment, education and living conditions.218 
                                                          
209.  See Legislative Update: The Bill on the Arrangement of Bedouin 
Settlement in the Negev (“Prawer-Begin Plan”), INTER AGENCY TASK FORCE ON 
ISRAELI ARAB ISSUES (July 2013), http://iataskforce.org/ 
sites/default/files/resource/resource-1058.pdf [hereinafter Prawer-Begin Plan].  
210.  See Yahel, Land Disputes, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
211.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 2. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. Legislation in Israel has to pass 3 readings of the Parliament. 
214.  BEGIN, supra note 178, at 2. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. at 3. 
218.  Id. 
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To achieve its goals, the Bill seeks to establish institutional and 
procedural safeguards.  The Bill’s purpose was to resolve and settle the 
Negev Bedouin’s land ownership disputes to develop the land and 
provide the Bedouin with settlement solutions.219 To help facilitate the 
Bedouin’s land claims and its economic development, the Bill 
established new administrative bodies, such as the “Implementation 
Authority,” the Headquarters of Economic and Community 
Development of the Negev Bedouin, and the Compensation 
Committee.220 
The Bill established detailed procedures allowing the Bedouin to 
claim land ownership and created a complex formula that helps 
calculate the Bedouin’s land and monetary compensations for the land 
claims.221 The Bill also defined the conditions that would make a land 
claimant eligible to receive compensations, including the claimant’s 
ability to show that the disputed land was claimed and registered during 
the “deciding period.”222 The Bill also established complex procedures 
for registering and approving land claims with the Compensation 
Committee.223 The Bill’s compensation formula is based on a criteria 
that considers the claimant’s ability to continuously cultivate the land 
and reach an agreement with at least fifty percent of other claimants, 
who are descendants of an original claimant.224 If less than fifty percent 
of the descendants agree to join the new plan, then the Compensation 
Committee would use a much lower compensation formula, which 
considers the land’s geographic characteristic (location or steepness of 
slope), its current use, and the time period of the claim’s filing.225 
B. Liberal Response to the Bill 
Liberals believed the Bill failed to consider objections from the 
Bedouin and human rights organization.  Individuals claim the Bill 
                                                          
219.  Id. at 6-7. 
220.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 3. 
221.  Id. at 12-13. 
222.   Id. Between 1971 to 1979, the State invited the Bedouin to submit land 
ownership claims.  In the 1970s, 3,200 claims were submitted, while there are 12,000 
land claimants. 
223.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 3. 
224.  Id. 
225.  Id. 
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failed to: (1) recognize the Bedouins’ historical connection with the 
Negev, (2) account for unrecognized villages in the Negev, and (3) 
account for practical considerations when it altered legal procedures. 
Liberals criticized the Bill, because the Bedouin community did not 
partake nor was consulted during the drafting of the new Bill.  
Moreover, the “listening period,” which occurred after the Bill was 
finalized, did not lead to substantial changes to the Bill’s original 
recommendations, despite the detailed objections voiced by the 
Bedouin community and human rights and planning organizations.226 
Liberals believed Minister Begin’s changes were mostly rhetorical and 
the few changes adopted did not substantially alter the logic, 
assumptions, or content of the Bill; aside from the type of land and 
amount of monetary compensation.227 
Liberals said the Bill did not address the historical connection 
between the Bedouin and the Negev, because it refused to allow the 
Bedouin to actually own Negev land.228 Instead, the Bill generally 
recognized the Bedouin individuals as “trespassers,” despite the 
existence of Bedouin villages before the establishment of the State of 
Israel.229 This belief derived from the fact that Bedouin villages had 
existed before other non-Bedouin villages were created and before the 
Bedouin were relocated to the Siyag region in the 1950’s.230 Thus, as 
original inhabitants of the Negev, some Bedouin individuals have 
continued to live on their ancestral land before the State of Israel’s 
establishment while other Bedouin were displaced many decades 
ago.231 
The Bill is also criticized because it does not sufficiently recognize 
villages and it gave  little regard to the Goldberg Committee’s 
recommendations, which called for extensive recognition of Bedouin 
villages.232 Liberals believed the Bill purports to create a new legal 
reality that rejects any recognition of the Bedouin’s history and land 
                                                          
226.  Id. at 5. 
227.  Id. 
228.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 5. 
229.  Id. 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. 
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claims.233 Therefore, the Bill purports to assume that land and monetary 
“compensations” are “beyond the letters of the law.”234 Consequently, 
the new Bill would result in the destruction of the unrecognized villages 
and the expulsion of village residents into new communities. 
The Bill’s provisions have failed to account for practical 
considerations when it altered legal procedures.235 Although the Bill 
allows administrative bodies to implement the law, the new law 
suspended and overruled existing planning laws and demolition 
procedures for Bedouin homes.236 The Bill also limits the scope of the 
courts’ authority to intervene in technical procedures, as it creates a new 
legal reality.237 In sum, the Bill would create a status similar to 
“emergency legislation,” which drastically limits the principle of 
equality before the law.238 
C. Conservative Response to the Bill 
Conservatives believed the Bill excessively catered to the 
Bedouin’s demands and that it allowed the Bedouin to violate existing 
laws.  Conservatives also believed the Bill’s plan created a more lenient 
legal and justice system for the Bedouin than the system was for 
existing Jews, who are subject to strict planning and zoning 
regulations.239 Further, due to natural reserves and military zones in the 
Negev, the Bedouin land claims involved twenty-three percent of the 
Negev land, not the five percent the Bedouin and human rights groups 
represented.240 Twenty-three percent of the Negev is substantially 
higher than the Bedouin’s share according to the proportionality of their 
population in the Negev.241 Therefore, Conservatives believe the plan 
excessively catered to the Bedouins more than what the Bedouins 
deserved. 
                                                          
233.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 6. 
234.  Id.  
235.  Id. 
236.  See id. 
237.  Id. 
238.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 6. 
239.  Id. 
240.  Id. 
241.  Id. 
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Conservatives also claimed the Bill “abolishes, in theory and 
practice, numerous court judgments” to legalize the Bedouin’s “land 
thefts” and is therefore unconstitutional.242 Further, the new plan would 
enable the retroactive legalization of tens of thousands of illegally-
constructed houses, thus “whitewashing” law breaking.243 Critics 
believed the new plan failed to address the need to halt all illegal 
construction and expansion of Bedouin settlements in the Negev.244 
Therefore, Conservatives believed the new Bill merely permitted the 
Bedouin to break the law. 
D. The Bill’s Legacy 
In 2011, the Israeli State’s attorney stopped proceeding with 
Bedouin cases in court.245 Later in 2012 and 2013, the State of Israel 
did not proceed with transforming the Bill into law.246 Today, the 
Bedouin land dispute remains stagnant, because Bedouin land claims 
are no longer in courts and legislation has not been created to implement 
the Goldberg and Prawer committees’ recommendations for the 
Bedouin’s land claims. 
Despite the halt in the dispute, the Israeli government decided to 
invest in the Negev’s development, including the development of 
Bedouin communities.247 A development plan sought to build 
additional Bedouin towns and invest millions of Israeli shekels into new 
Bedouin settlements.248 Some of the new settlements were planned for 
                                                          
242.  Id. 
243.  Prawer-Begin Plan, supra note 209, at 7. 
244.  Id. 
245.  See Press Release, Be’er Sheva District Court Rejects State’s Appeal; 
Demolition Orders against Arab Bedouin Village of Alsira Remain Cancelled, The 
Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/8273. 
246.  Press Release, Adalah: The Government’s Decision to Cancel the Prawer 
Plan Bill is a Major Achievement, The Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 
(Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/8228.  
247.  See The Negev 2020 Plan, Keren Kayemeth Lelsrael Jewish National 
Fund, http://www.kkl-jnf.org/about-kkl-jnf/kkl-jnf-year-to-year/112-years/negev-
2020-plan/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2018). 
248.  Israel to build new towns for Bedouins, the disabled, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC 
AGENCY (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.jta.org/2018/08/13/top-headlines/israel-build-
new-towns-bedouins-disabled.  
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agricultural development.249 In February 2017, the Israeli government 
decided to invest about one billion dollars in existing Bedouin towns 
for the next five years.250 This investment would promote better quality 
of life for the Negev Bedouin.  However, despite the government’s 
commitment to investments and developments, the Bedouin’s land 
claims and the illegal construction in the Negev will remain in dispute 
for the State of Israel and Negev Bedouins. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bedouin’s land claims entangled complicated historical and 
cultural questions with legal issues.  During the first years of its 
establishment, the State of Israel was busy dealing with its survival 
issues and thus avoided the Bedouin’s land claims.  As Bedouin 
communities grew larger in the Negev without recognition from the 
Israeli government, the Bedouin illegally constructed necessary 
housing.  Consequently, the Israeli government believed it needed to 
establish order in the Negev.  As a legal matter, it was also important 
for courts to adjudicate the Bedouin’s land claims.  Based on the ruling 
from the Al Hawashella case and the Al Uqbi case, the Bedouin 
understood the unlikelihood of succeeding in its land disputes; thus, the 
Bedouin needed a more comprehensive approach. 
Although the Supreme Court adopted the State of Israel’s legal 
arguments in the Al Hawashella case and Al Uqbi case, the State 
recognized the need to invest in the Negev for the benefit of its 
inhabitants, including the Bedouin Population.  The State 
acknowledged that building new towns will expedite the settlements 
process with Bedouin individuals and adhere to the Goldberg and 
Prawer Committees’ recommendations.  Ultimately, the government 
realized that a settlement approach is more beneficial than passing a 
highly-criticized law. 
                                                          
249.  Strategy for Agricultural Development in Bedouin Villages in the Negev, 
ZENOVAR, http://www.zenovar.com/en/project/strategy-for-agricultural-
development-in-bedouin-villages-in-the-negev/ (last visited Nov. 27 2018). 
250.  See generally The Future is Beautiful: One Billion Dollar Roadmap for 
the Next Decade, JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, 
http://usa.jnf.org/assets/pdf/thebilliondollarroadmap_digital_v-1.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2018). 
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Because the Israeli government previously denied a suggested 
international mediation, the idea of mediation would be impractical 
today.  However, the State of Israel’s current policy to compromise with 
the Bedouin hopefully will resolve the Bedouin land disputes in the near 
future. 
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